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HenryTo
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 Posted: Mon Nov 24, 2008 1:52 am Post subject: Iran |
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President Ahmadinejad asserts that the Iranian economy can cope with an oil price of $5 a barrel. This story reminds me of the infamous Iraqi Information Minister right before the fall of Baghdad in April 2003:
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Iran could cope with oil as low as $5 - Ahmadinejad
Sun Nov 23, 2008 3:41pm IST
By Hashem Kalantari
TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran could live with an oil price as low as $5 per barrel, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying on Sunday, in comments at odds with the views of the IMF and economic analysts.
Like other major crude exporters, Iran is facing declining revenue as global oil prices have tumbled by two-thirds to $50 per barrel since July amidst a world financial crisis, after years of windfall gains that have boosted reserves.
But Ahmadinejad, who is expected to run again in next year's presidential election, said the oil price fall would have no major impact on the economy of the world's fourth-largest crude producer, official media reported.
"There was a time when the country managed on $9 a barrel. We can do it even if oil falls to $5," he told reporters at a media fair in Tehran, state television said, without giving detail on how his government would handle such a situation.
Oil tumbled below $10 a barrel in 1998.
"Just as the world banking crisis has had no impact on Iran's economy, neither will the oil price have that much impact," the official IRNA news agency quoted him as saying.
U.S. crude traded at just below $50 per barrel on Friday and analysts say Iran will almost certainly have to cut spending in the 2009-10 budget unless the price bounces back to $70 or more, posing a challenge for Ahmadinejad during an election year.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in a report in August that if the price of Iranian crude fell to $75 a barrel, Iran would face a current account deficit in the medium term that would be tough to sustain due to its financial isolation.
"ARROGANT COUNTRIES"
Iran is under tightening U.N. and U.S. sanctions over its refusal to halt sensitive nuclear work the West suspects is aimed at making bombs, a charge Tehran denies.
Earlier this month, when crude still traded at close to $70, a senior central bank official warned that Iran's economy would "face big problems" if the average oil price fell below a level of around $60 a barrel over the next four months.
But Ahmadinejad, who is facing growing criticism at home over his economic management and failure to rein in double-digit inflation, said planned reforms would limit the fall-out.
"Contrary to some opinions ... that the drop in the oil price would have a deep impact on Iran's economy, through plans and projects it would almost have no impact ... particularly with the government's overhaul that is under way," he said.
He was referring to a government plan to rejig Iran's extensive subsidy system by focusing payments more directly to those in need. Critics say it risks further stoking inflation, which is running at almost 30 percent year-on-year.
The president, who often rails against the West, suggested that Iran's foes would suffer more from the turmoil sweeping the world economy.
"We believe that the era of the arrogant countries' economic dominance has reached the end of the road and is on the verge of collapse," he said. Iranian leaders often refer to the United States and other Western powers as "global arrogance." |
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HenryTo
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| Posted: Tue Jan 24, 2012 4:35 pm Post subject: |
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Stratfor on Iran.
| Quote: | Considering a U.S.-Iranian Deal
Last week, I wrote on the strategic challenge Iran faces in its bid to shape a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Beirut on the eastern Mediterranean coast. I also pointed out the limited options available to the United States and other Western powers to counter Iran.
One was increased efforts to block Iranian influence in Syria. The other was to consider a strategy of negotiation with Iran. In the past few days, we have seen hints of both.
Rebel Gains in Syria
The city of Zabadani in southwestern Syria reportedly has fallen into the hands of anti-regime forces. Though the city does not have much tactical value for the rebels, and the regime could well retake it, the event could have real significance. Up to this point, apart from media attention, the resistance to the regime of President Bashar al Assad has not proven particularly effective. It was certainly not able to take and hold territory, which is critical for any insurgency to have significance.
Now that the rebels have taken Zabadani amid much fanfare -- even though it is not clear to what extent the city was ceded to their control, much less whether they will be able to hold it against Syrian military action -- a small bit of Syria now appears to be under rebel control. The longer they can hold it, the weaker al Assad will look and the more likely it becomes that regime opponents can create a provisional government on Syrian soil to rally around.
Zabadani also gives outside powers something to help defend, should they choose to do so. Intervening in a civil war against weak and diffused rebels is one thing. Attacking Syrian tanks moving to retake Zabadani is quite another. There are no indications that this is under consideration, but for the first time, there is the potential for a militarily viable target set for outside players acting on behalf of the rebels. The existence of that possibility might change the dynamic in Syria. When we take into account the atmospherics of the Arab League demands for a provisional government, some meaningful pressure might actually emerge.
From the Iranian point of view, this raises the risk that the sphere of influence Tehran is pursuing will be blocked by the fall of the al Assad regime. This would not pose a fundamental challenge to Iran, so long as its influence in Iraq remains intact, but it would represent a potential high-water mark in Iranian ambitions. It could open the door to recalculations in Tehran as to the limits of Iranian influence and the threat to their national security. I must not overstate this: Events in Syria have not gone that far, and Iran is hardly backed into a corner. Still, it is a reminder to Tehran that all might not go the Iranians' way.
A Possibility of Negotiations
It is in this context that the possibility of negotiations has arisen. The Iranians have claimed that the letter the U.S. administration sent to Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that defined Iran's threats to Strait of Hormuz as a red line contained a second paragraph offering direct talks with Iran. After hesitation, the United States denied the offer of talks, but it did not deny it had sent a message to the Iranian leadership. The Iranians then claimed such an offer was made verbally to Tehran and not in the letter. Washington again was not categorical in its denial. On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during a meeting with the German foreign minister, "We do not seek conflict. We strongly believe the people of Iran deserve a better future. They can have that future, the country can be reintegrated into the global community ... when their government definitively turns away from pursuing nuclear weapons."
From our perspective, this is a critical idea. As we have said for several years, we do not see Iran as close to having a nuclear weapon. They may be close to being able to test a crude nuclear device under controlled circumstances (and we don't know this either), but the development of a deliverable nuclear weapon poses major challenges for Iran.
Moreover, while the Iranians may aspire to a deterrent via a viable nuclear weapons capability, we do not believe the Iranians see nuclear weapons as militarily useful. A few such weapons could devastate Israel, but Iran would be annihilated in retaliation. While the Iranians talk aggressively, historically they have acted cautiously. For Iran, nuclear weapons are far more valuable as a notional threat and bargaining chip than as something to be deployed. Indeed, the ideal situation is not quite having a weapon, and therefore not forcing anyone to act against them, but seeming close enough to be taken seriously. They certainly have achieved that.
The important question, therefore, is this: What would the United States offer if Iran made meaningful concessions on its nuclear program, and what would Iran want in return? In other words, forgetting the nuclear part of the equation, what did Hillary Clinton mean when she said that Iran can be reintegrated into the international community, and what would Iran actually want?
Recall that in our view, nuclear weapons never have been the issue. Instead, the issue has been the development of an Iranian sphere of influence following the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq, and the pressure Iran could place on oil-producing states on the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has long felt that its natural role as leader in the Persian Gulf has been thwarted, first by the Ottomans, then the British and now by the Americans, and they have wanted to create what they regard as the natural state of things.
The United States and its allies do not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. But more than that, they do not want to see Iran as the dominant conventional force in the area able to use its influence to undermine the Saudis. With or without nuclear weapons, the United States must contain the Iranians to protect their Saudi allies. But the problem is that Iran is not contained in Syria yet, and even were it contained in Syria, it is not contained in Iraq. Iran has broken out of its containment in a decisive fashion, and its ability to exert pressure in Arabia is substantial.
Assume for the moment that Iran was willing to abandon its nuclear program. What would the United States give in return? Obviously, Clinton would like to offer an end to the sanctions. But the sanctions on Iran are simply not that onerous with the Russians and Chinese not cooperating and the United States being forced to allow the Japanese and others not to participate fully. But it goes deeper.
Iran's Historic Opportunity
This is a historic opportunity for Iran. It is the first moment in which no outside power is in a direct position to block Iran militarily or politically. Whatever the pain of sanctions, trading that moment for lifting the sanctions would not be rational. The threat of Iranian influence is the problem, and Iran would not trade that influence for an end to sanctions. So assuming the nuclear issue was to go away, what exactly is the United States prepared to offer?
The United States has assured access to oil from the Persian Gulf -- not only for itself, but also for the global industrial world -- since World War II. It does not want to face a potential interruption of oil for any reason, like the one that occurred in 1973. Certainly, as Iran expands its influence, the possibility of conflict increases, along with the possibility that the United States would intervene to protect its allies in Arabia from Iranian-sponsored subversion or even direct attack. The United States does not want to intervene in the region. It does not want an interruption of oil. It also does not want an extension of Iranian power. It is not clear that Washington can have all three.
Iran wants three things, too.
First, it wants the United States to reduce its presence in the Persian Gulf dramatically. Having seen two U.S. interventions against Iraq and one against Afghanistan, Iran is aware of U.S. power and the way American political sentiment can shift. It experienced the shift from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, so it knows how fast things can change. Tehran sees the United States in the Persian Gulf coupled with U.S. and Israeli covert operations and destabilization campaigns as an unpredictable danger to Iranian national security.
Second, the Iranians want to be recognized as the leading power in the region. This does not mean they intend to occupy any nation directly. It does mean that Iran doesn't want Saudi Arabia, for example, to pose a military threat against it.
Third, Iran wants a restructuring of oil revenue in the region. How this is formally achieved -- whether by allowing Iranian investment in Arabian oil companies (possibly financed by the host country) or some other means -- is unimportant. What does matter is that the Iranians want a bigger share of the region's vast financial resources.
The United States doesn't want a conflict with Iran. Iran doesn't want one with the United States. Neither can be sure how such a conflict would play out. The Iranians want to sell oil. The Americans want the West to be able to buy oil. The issue really comes down to whether the United States wants to guarantee the flow of oil militarily or via a political accommodation with the country that could disrupt the flow of oil -- namely, Iran. That in turn raises two questions. First, could the United States trust Iran? And second, could it live with withdrawing the American protectorate on the Arabian Peninsula, casting old allies adrift?
When we listen to the rhetoric of American and Iranian politicians, it is difficult to imagine trust between them. But when we recall the U.S. alliance with Stalin and Mao or the Islamic republic's collaboration with the Soviet Union, we find rhetoric is a very poor guide. Nations pursue their national interest, and while those interests are never eternal, they can be substantial. From a purely rhetorical point of view it is not always easy to tell which sides' politicians are more colorful. It will be difficult to sell an alliance between the Great Satan and a founding member of the Axis of Evil to the respective public of each country, but harder things have been managed.
Iran's ultimate interest is security against the United States and the ability to sell oil at a more substantial profit. (This would entail an easing of sanctions and a redefinition of how oil revenues in the region are distributed.) The United States' ultimate interest is access to oil and manageable prices that do not require American military intervention. On that basis, Iranian and American interests are not that far apart.
The Arabian Factor and a Possible Accommodation
The key point in this scenario is the future of U.S. relations with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Any deal between Iran and the United States affects them two ways. First, the reduction of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf requires them to reach an accommodation with the Iranians, something difficult and potentially destabilizing for them. Second, the shift in the financial flow will hurt them and probably will not be the final deal. Over time, the Iranians will use their strengthened position in the region to continue pushing for additional concessions from them.
There is always danger in abandoning allies. Other allies might be made uncomfortable, for example. But these things have happened before. Abandoning old allies for the national interest is not something the United States invented. The idea that the United States should find money flowing to the Saudis inherently more attractive than money flowing to the Iranians is not obvious.
The main question for the United States is how Iran might be contained. The flow of money will strengthen Iran, and it might seek to extend its power beyond what is tolerable to the United States. There are potential answers. First, the United States can always return to the region. The Iranians do not see the Americans as weak, but rather as unpredictable. Challenging the United States after Iran has achieved its historic goal is not likely. Second, no matter how Iran grows, it is far behind Turkey by every measure. Turkey is not ready to play an active role balancing Iran now, but in the time it takes Iran to consolidate its position, Turkey will be a force that will balance and eventually contain Iran. In the end, a deal will come down to one that profits both sides and clearly defines the limits of Iranian power -- limits that it is in Iran's interest to respect given that it is profiting mightily from the deal.
Geopolitics leads in one direction. Ideology leads in another direction. The ability to trust one another is yet a third. At the same time, the Iranians cannot be sure of what the United States is prepared to do. The Americans do not want to go to war with Iran. Both want oil flowing, and neither cares about nuclear weapons as much as they pretend. Finally, no one else really matters in this deal. The Israelis are not as hardline on Iran as they appear, nor will the United States listen to Israel on a matter fundamental to the global economy. In the end, absent nuclear weapons, Israel does not have that much of a problem with Iran.
It would not surprise me to find out that the United States offered direct talks, nor to discover that Clinton's comments could not be extended to a more extensive accommodation. Nor do I think that Iran would miss a chance for an historic transformation of its strategic and financial position in favor of ideology. They are much too cynical for that. The great losers would be the Saudis, but even they could come around to a deal that, while less satisfactory than they have now, is still quite satisfactory.
There are many blocks in the way of such a deal, from ideology to distrust to domestic politics. But given the knot that is being tied in the region, rumors that negotiations are being floated come as no surprise. Syria might not go the way Iran wants, and Iraq is certainly not going the way the United States wants. Marriages have been built on less. |
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rffrydr
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| Posted: Mon Jan 09, 2012 11:38 am Post subject: |
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Though I am not as blasé as this article (blockades are after all an act of war) it is no small accident that this coincides with the Military Industrial Complex falling into another accident: an automatic, autocratic budget crises.
http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/TheAtlantic/~3/Ck_nre12GTo/
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rffrydr
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| Posted: Wed Jan 04, 2012 9:37 am Post subject: |
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Iran getting desperate: populace alienated and sanctions hurting. Don't think their threats to the Straights will stay in the market for long. Watch for gov. to fall this year.
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HenryTo
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| Posted: Sat Dec 24, 2011 8:57 pm Post subject: |
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Stratfor on the US withdrawal from Iraq, and potential Iranian influences.
| Quote: | Director of Strategic Intelligence Reva Bhalla examines the prospects for Iraq now that U.S. troops have left and the hope of a new dawn looks increasingly improbable as sectarian divisions intensify and the Shia seek to consolidate their grip on the country.
Welcome to Agenda with Reva Bhalla. Reva, I’m reminded of that old war song, “Home for Christmas,” but what’s left behind in Iraq isn’t exactly a season of peace and goodwill.
Reva: No not at all, in fact Colin even before the dust settled on that last U.S. convoy leaving Iraq the Iraqi politicians are already at each other’s throats and we’re seeing a major political crisis erupt in Baghdad as we speak.
Colin: The Shia are in charge and likely to remain so.
Reva: Yes, and really what we’re seeing here is a period of Shiite consolidation. And this is, in many ways, very much expected. If you look at the geopolitical framework of this conflict you can see very clearly that when the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, a power vacuum would be created that would allow the Shia, and Iran by extension, to fill that vacuum, consolidate their influence, secure Iran’s western flank and, in Iran’s view, use Iraq as a launch pad to project its influence in the wider Arab region. These were all things that Iran was preparing for for a long time.
And in the internal politics of Iraq you saw a number of Shiite politicians, particularly Nouri al-Maliki, the prime minister, emerging as a strongman and asserting Shiite authority there. And this is exactly what we’re seeing now, is that consolidation phase — but it’s going to be a very torrential phase because they’re facing a lot of opposition from the Sunnis and Kurds, understandably.
Colin: Now I’m going to put up a map, which I think shows how complicated Iraq has become since Saddam Hussein was ousted.
Reva: Yes, very much so. And I think in order to understand this conflict a bit better it’s a good idea to kind of run through the different sectarian groups that we’re looking at and understand what exactly they’re going after. So if you take a look at the Shia, again, this is a period of consolidation for them. Already Maliki has gone to great ends in trying to consolidate his authority in the political, the economic and the security spheres of the state. And he’s made considerable progress so far.
When you look at the Sunnis, they’re in a very desperate situation. They don’t have the energy assets that the Kurds do — they really only have the militant card to have their political voice heard. And without U.S. backing it’s becoming harder and harder for them to resist. And so the Sunnis, in trying to promote their leverage, resorted to pushing for their own autonomy drive. This is something we saw develop in recent months. They started first in Anbar Province, then in Salahuddin Province, which are majority Sunni, and then it spread to the more ethnically mixed Diyala Province. Then when they pushed for autonomy in Diyala, we saw a pretty harsh Shiite reaction immediately, where the Shiite-controlled central government declared the move as illegal. We saw militias deployed, Shiite rallies emerge and overall there was a very strong reaction to that Sunni move. And that’s exactly what we’re seeing today in these arrests of Sunni politicians.
Colin: And of course, there’s a warrant for the arrest of Iraq’s most senior Sunni politician, vice president in fact.
Reva: Yes, the vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, has been issued an arrest warrant based on terrorism charges. It’s not only him either. Maliki’s Sunni deputy is also potentially facing arrest and so that’s really sending the message to every major Sunni politician in Iraq right now, who is asking themselves, “Am I going to be next?” So really, the Sunnis are facing some pretty stark choices. They can either accommodate themselves very reluctantly to the Shia, they can face arrest (or worse) or they can try to resist. But again it’s going to be harder to sustain a resistance under these geopolitical conditions than it was, say, three years ago.
Colin: When we think about these terrorism charges — are they genuine? Or trumped up?
Reva: Well the Sunnis, as I said, have very little leverage in this conflict overall. And so their biggest card lies in the militancy card. And so it’s perfectly reasonable to see certain Sunni politicians resorting to militancy in order to increase their political leverage. Now Maliki could very well have legitimate charges against these politicians — in fact he says that he had charges against Tariq al-Hashimi up to three years ago, but he waited until now to reveal them. Now Maliki said that he only did this now because before he was more worried about destabilizing Iraq, but really you can see that Maliki was waiting for a more politically opportune time to reveal these charges and go after these Sunni politicians, as soon as the United States withdrew its forces from the country.
Colin: And then of course there are the Kurds.
Reva: The Kurds are definitely an interesting actor in this mix. Remember that the Kurds really have three different factors that make up the foundation for their political autonomy. One of those is their mountainous geography that allows them some distance from the factional fray in Baghdad. Second, the Kurds have significant energy assets in the north, and they use that energy leverage by getting foreign firms to invest in those fields as a form of a security guarantee against their Arab rivals. Three, is the U.S. backing, and that is a factor that’s glaringly absent from that formula now — now that the United States has withdrawn from Iraq. The Kurds have lost that main security guarantor. So the Kurds have an important decision to make as well. They can either accommodate themselves to the Shia, very reluctantly, or they can choose to remain aligned with the Sunnis against the larger Shia threat at the moment. So far it really remains to be seen what the Kurds are actually going to do. Right now they’ve been providing safe haven to the Sunni vice president in the Kurdish Regional Government territory and they’ve been saying that they’re not going to hand over Tariq al-Hashimi to the central government, but that’s something that could shift over the next few days as the Shia continue to exert pressure on the Kurds. Overall, the Kurds don’t have their security guarantor, they’re facing a bigger threat against the Shia, the Sunnis are in a weakened position — it looks like they are going to have to eventually strike a deal.
Colin: So how do we see the situation on the ground in 2012?
Reva: Well we’re going to see a lot of political jockeying as the Shia attempt to consolidate their influence in Iraq. That’s a perfectly natural outcome. But we’re also seeing some strong authoritarian politics in play as politicians, like Nouri al-Maliki, is trying to emerge as the strongman of Iraq. And remember that Iraq really is an artificial political entity in many ways. It’s severely divided among ethno-sectarian lines and it takes a strongman — before it was Saddam Hussein — and now we have a sectarian turnover with the Shia in charge and Maliki trying to fulfill that role. And so we’re going to see a lot of jockeying back and forth between these factions as they try to resist that. Overall though, I think the underlying trend lies in favor of the Shia. It’s going to be messy, but I think this is really the consolidation period.
Colin: What are the strategic implications — particularly for the supply of Iraqi oil?
Reva: Well the political struggle is not going to calm down anytime soon, as you can see. And especially given the fact that the U.S. has left this security vacuum in place and the Iranians are intent on filling that vacuum and asserting their influence, we’re going to see a lot of competition result. The key thing to keep in mind here is that the main Sunni stakeholders in the region — those being Turkey and Saudi Arabia — who do have influence in Iraq, but are not positioned well enough to deal with Iran. This really means that Iraq is going to be that natural proxy battleground in this broader geopolitical war.
Colin: And Iran watches and waits. What moves does STRATFOR think Iran could make next year?
Reva: Well remember, Iran has a very strong hand in Iraq. They’ve been building up their political, intelligence, security, economic and religious assets in this country well before at the fall of Saddam Hussein. So they’ve been waiting for this historic opportunity for centuries — waiting to consolidate Shia power in the heart of Mesopotamia. So they’re not going to pass this up. That means Iran is going to be very heavily involved in Iraq. They’re not going to be able to transform Iraq into an Iranian satellite, but at the very least they can block the Iraqis from signing onto other strategic partnerships and limiting their cooperation with Iranian rivals such as the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And so this is really Iran’s moment and what we really need to watch is whether Iran is going to be able to use Iraq, not only as security for its western flank, but whether Iran is going to be able to use Iraq as a launch pad to project its influence in the wider region. And that’s something where Iran does face constraints, but that is the goal. And that’s why we’re going to see groups and countries, like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United States, band together in trying to put a lid on Iran’s expansionist goals.
Colin: Now, if you were going to put money on it, would you say that Iran is going to seize the day?
Reva: This is Iran’s moment to seize the day. I still think they’re facing a number of constraints, but in Iraq they do have the strongest hand.
Colin: Reva, thanks for that analysis. Reva Bhalla, ending Agenda for this week. Join us again next week for the last Agenda of the year. From me, Colin Chapman, the season’s greetings to you all. |
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rffrydr
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rffrydr
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| Posted: Sun Jan 30, 2011 9:23 am Post subject: |
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Iran is the pressing question raised by Cairo, not Yemen. If the Strafor account below is correct then there is an Islamist print on that revolution but if the liberalizing iPhone toters represent the true course of sentiment there then we can have revolution II. Ideas always come from above.
If it's true, as I surmise, that the poor in the arab countries cannot stand the mirror of CHINDIA et. al., then, at last, the instincts of these disparate groups can be united. And that this all stems from a chinese autocracy "buying off" their authority makes it one of the grand ironies of our time 
Any updates from Stratfor on this one?
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HenryTo
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rffrydr
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rffrydr
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| Posted: Sat Jun 20, 2009 3:47 pm Post subject: |
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What Stratfor missed apparently was the heretofore impossible showing of women in the polls. Had the margin of victory been within the "realm of possibility the public may have tolerated the process. As it was, it was an insult.
Today it's clear that the same impulse towards reform quashed in the face of Baghdad's fall can no longer be resisted. $70 crude has come too late--and, surprisingly, too little.
For those thinking this movement would not be possible without web-nebulous twitter should recall the Iranian uprising of 1906 (that other panic) and dissemination by clandestine "jellygraph":
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hectograph
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diesel
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| Posted: Mon Jun 15, 2009 4:20 pm Post subject: |
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Iran is one of the most liberal Muslim countries on earth. It will be increasingly liberal, if left alone.
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HenryTo
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| Posted: Mon Jun 15, 2009 1:31 pm Post subject: |
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Stratfor's take on the Iranian election:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090615_western_misconceptions_meet_iranian_reality
| Quote: | Misreading Sentiment in Iran
Limited to information on Iran from English-speaking opponents of the regime, both groups of Iran experts got a very misleading vision of where the revolution was heading — because the Iranian revolution was not brought about by the people who spoke English. It was made by merchants in city bazaars, by rural peasants, by the clergy — people Americans didn’t speak to because they couldn’t. This demographic was unsure of the virtues of modernization and not at all clear on the virtues of liberalism. From the time they were born, its members knew the virtue of Islam, and that the Iranian state must be an Islamic state.
Americans and Europeans have been misreading Iran for 30 years. Even after the shah fell, the myth has survived that a mass movement of people exists demanding liberalization — a movement that if encouraged by the West eventually would form a majority and rule the country. We call this outlook “iPod liberalism,” the idea that anyone who listens to rock ‘n’ roll on an iPod, writes blogs and knows what it means to Twitter must be an enthusiastic supporter of Western liberalism. Even more significantly, this outlook fails to recognize that iPod owners represent a small minority in Iran — a country that is poor, pious and content on the whole with the revolution forged 30 years ago.
There are undoubtedly people who want to liberalize the Iranian regime. They are to be found among the professional classes in Tehran, as well as among students. Many speak English, making them accessible to the touring journalists, diplomats and intelligence people who pass through. They are the ones who can speak to Westerners, and they are the ones willing to speak to Westerners. And these people give Westerners a wildly distorted view of Iran. They can create the impression that a fantastic liberalization is at hand — but not when you realize that iPod-owning Anglophones are not exactly the majority in Iran.
Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about two-thirds of the vote. Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad. It is, of course, interesting to meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial. A poll therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and other urban areas. Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside Tehran, and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.
Some still charge that Ahmadinejad cheated. That is certainly a possibility, but it is difficult to see how he could have stolen the election by such a large margin. Doing so would have required the involvement of an incredible number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly did not jibe with sentiment in each precinct. Widespread fraud would mean that Ahmadinejad manufactured numbers in Tehran without any regard for the vote. But he has many powerful enemies who would quickly have spotted this and would have called him on it. Mousavi still insists he was robbed, and we must remain open to the possibility that he was, although it is hard to see the mechanics of this. |
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nodoodahs
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| Posted: Sat Jun 13, 2009 6:58 pm Post subject: |
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Make no mistake, the U.S. government got who they wanted elected. They prefer hostile relations with Iran, it furthers their interests.
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I haven’t seen a beatin’ like that since somebody stuck a banana in my pants and turned a monkey loose. |
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diesel
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Joined: 05 Oct 2006
Posts: 793
Location: Australia & New Zealand
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| Posted: Sat Jun 13, 2009 6:42 pm Post subject: |
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As usual the US and its allies are screaming that this is a fake election, the chances are high that it is fake. It is as fake as the recent Mexican election. It is as fake as a recent US election where, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that US citizens have no right to vote for President so there is no right to count the votes carefully. Then, they basically handed over the government to the guy who got fewer votes! So, the question is, who are we to complain?
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All cats are gray in the dark. |
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rffrydr
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Joined: 30 Oct 2005
Posts: 16937
Location: Sunny California
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HenryTo
Site Admin
Joined: 06 Aug 2004
Posts: 11736
Location: Los Angeles, California
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| Posted: Fri Jun 12, 2009 7:39 pm Post subject: |
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Courtesy of Stratfor:
Red Alert: Iran's Election Results (Open Access)
June 12, 2009 | 2116 GMT
BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images
The Iranian election is currently in turmoil. Both Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi are claiming to be ahead in the vote. Preliminary results from the presidential vote show Ahmadinejad leading; Iranian Election Commission chief Kamran Danesho held a press conference at 11:45 p.m. local time and announced that with some 20 percent of the votes counted, the president was leading with 3,462,548 votes (69.04 percent), while his main challenger, Mousavi, had 1, 425,678 (28.42 percent). Sources tell STRATFOR that these preliminary numbers pertain to the votes from the smaller towns and villages, where the president has considerable influence, as he has distributed a lot of cash to the poor.
However, Iran’s state-run Press TV is saying that only 10 million of 24 million votes, or around 42 percent of the vote, have been counted. At the same time, they are also claiming that 69 percent of the vote has been counted. Obviously the numbers are not adding up, and the agencies themselves appear to be in chaos.
Prior to the announcement of the results, Mousavi held a press conference in which he said he was the winner of the election. The opposition camp is greatly concerned about fraud, and STRATFOR has been told that Mousavi has vowed to resist any fraud, even if it entails taking to the streets. This means there is considerable risk of unrest should Ahmadinejad emerge as the winner. But so far there is no evidence that the government is mobilizing security forces to deal with any such eventuality.
The situation is being monitored carefully, as it is potentially explosive. |
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